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UNIVERSITY IMPRIMATURS ON STUDENT
SPEECH: THE CERTIFICATION CASES
EMILY GOLD WALDMAN
Consider the following situations, all from real cases:
A student enrolled in a public university's Actor Training
Program is encouraged to withdraw after she repeatedly refuses, during
class acting exercises, to perform lines from scenes or monologues that
include the words "fuck," "Goddamn," or other phrases taking God's
.. 1
name in vain.
A student pursuing a Master of Social Work degree at a public
university is dismissed from a required field practicum, which is a
prerequisite for obtaining the degree, after he tells a psychiatric patient
that one place she can find a bereavement support group is "church." 2
A student studying in a state university's Mortuary Science
Program is sanctioned after she makes several posts on her Facebook
page about cadaver dissection, including "[w]ho knew embalming lab
was so cathartic! I still want to stab a certain someone in the throat with a
trocar though."3
These three situations obviously have some factual differences.
Indeed, the courts deciding the resulting free speech claims used three
different legal frameworks for evaluating them, applying the student
speech standard from Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier4 to the
first case, the public employee speech framework created by Pickering v.
Board of Education' to the second case, and a newly-created test for
speech violating established professional conduct standards to the third
case.6 But the cases are also linked by a connective thread. In all of
. Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. J.D., Harvard
Law School, 2002; B.A., Yale University, 1999.
1. See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004).
2. See Watts v. Fla. Int'l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2007).
3. See Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 2012).
4. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
5. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
6. Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 521.
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them, the student's speech-or refusal to speak-undermined the
university's confidence that the student would be an appropriate member
of the profession for which the university was training him or her. This
Article explores the unique mix of First Amendment issues raised by
such conflicts and analyzes how courts are, and should be, resolving
them.
The Article begins in Part I by describing these cases and then
examining what makes them a distinct category within the larger student
speech landscape. As I discuss, the student speech framework was
largely developed by the Supreme Court in the K-12 public school
context. Conflicts over student speech in universities, in turn, have
generally centered on the extent to which the K-12 framework should
carry over to the higher education context, given the greater
independence and maturity of university students. Recent cases about
universities' ability to control student publications, for example, fall into
this mold, with courts evaluating whether the same rules for high school
newspapers should apply to college newspapers. This particular subset
of university speech cases, however, introduces an additional
consideration that is simply inapplicable in the K-12 context (and often
in the university context as well, depending on the specific student
speech dispute): the certification role that these professional-training
programs are playing. Officially or unofficially, universities here-to
the extent that they allow the students in their professional-training
programs to complete the program and graduate-are signing off on their
students' fitness to enter the profession in question. Although the
students are not yet employees and their universities are not their
employers, they are closer to this relationship than in the standard student
speech case.
The remainder of this Article argues that this certification
dynamic has three important First Amendment implications, all pointing
toward significant, but not unlimited, deference to universities here.
First, as I discuss in Part II, this dynamic makes particularly relevant
Hazelwood's emphasis on giving schools broad reign to control student
speech that may reasonably be seen as bearing the schools' own
imprimatur. Although some aspects of Hazelwood's reasoning are less
7. See, e.g., Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005); Kincaid v. Gibson,
236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001).
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relevant in the university setting, this specific theme has new and
important resonance here. Second, and more broadly, Part III situates
these conflicts within the larger discussion about the appropriate level of
judicial deference to universities, and argues that they are prime
candidates for a very high level of deference, given the reasons
articulated by courts and scholars for whether and when such deference
should exist. Finally, Part IV probes the analogy between students in
professional-training programs and public employees. The analogy is
useful, but only goes so far, and thus simultaneously bolsters the
argument for substantial deference and helps point toward where the
limits on such deference should lie. Part V pulls together the Hazelwood,
university deference, and public employment strands in connection with
the certification cases, offering some guiding principles for a more
unified framework. Finally, Part VI provides a brief conclusion.
I. THE "CERTIFICATION" CASES: A DISTINCT CATEGORY WITHIN THE
STUDENT SPEECH LANDSCAPE
The Supreme Court has decided four student speech cases, all in
the context of K-12 public education. First, the Court ruled in Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District that schools could
restrict student speech only when it was reasonably likely to either
materially disrupt school operations or to invade the rights of others.9
Next, the Court held in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,0 that
schools were entitled to restrict student speech that was "plainly
offensive," without resort to either of Tinker's two prongs." The
following year, the Court held in Hazelwood that schools could restrict
student speech communicated through a school-sponsored medium-i.e.,
in "school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other
expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public
might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school"-as
long as their actions were "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
8. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
9. Id. at 513.
10. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
11. Id. at 683.
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concerns."12 The Court thus divided the student speech universe, giving
schools far greater discretion over school-sponsored speech than over
student speech that just "happen[ed] to occur" at school.13 Finally, in
2007, the Court held in Morse v. Frederickl4 that schools had the power
to restrict student speech that could "reasonably be regarded as
encouraging illegal drug use."
Because the Supreme Court has not decided a pure student
speech case in the university context, much of the lower court action here
centers on whether and how the above framework should carry over to
higher education, given the differences between K-12 students and
university students. The circuits have divided, for instance, as to whether
Hazelwood's deferential standard for high school newspapers should
apply to university-subsidized student publications.16 Even those courts
concluding that Hazelwood should still apply, however, have indicated
that the ultimate Hazelwood analysis will often play out differently in the
university setting.' 7 Similarly, several courts have held that university
speech codes are subject to more stringent First Amendment review than
that provided by the Tinker-Fraser-Hazelwood-Morse framework. In
2010, for instance, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit struck
down as overbroad a student code of conduct that prohibited students
from displaying "offensive" signs in places like the field house, school
fields, cafeteria, and arts center. The court explained:
Public universities have significantly less leeway in
regulating student speech than public elementary or
12. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271, 273 (1988).
13. Id. at 281.
14. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
15. Id. at 397.
16. Compare, e.g., Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that
Hazelwood should apply to such cases), with Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 346
n.5 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating, pursuant to parties' agreement, that Hazelwood has
"little application" to university publications). The Hazelwood Court itself left this
issue open, stating that "[w]e need not now decide whether the same degree of
deference is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the
college and university level." Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 n.7.
17. See, e.g., Hosty, 412 F.3d at 734-35 ("To the extent that the justification
for editorial control depends on the audience's maturity, the difference between high
school and university students may be important.").
18. McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2010).
20131 UNIVERSITY IMPRIMATURS 385
high schools. Admittedly, it is difficult to explain
how this principle should be applied in practice and
it is unlikely that any broad categorical rules will
emerge from its application. At a minimum, the
teachings of Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, Morse,
and other decisions involving speech in public
elementary and high schools, cannot be taken as
gospel in cases involving public universities. Any
application of free speech doctrine derived from
these decisions to the university setting should be
scrutinized carefully, with an emphasis on the
underlying reasoning of the rule to be applied.1 9
The Third Circuit's emphasis on the "underlying reasoning" of the
Supreme Court's student speech decisions is logical, and supports the
notion that the Court's student speech framework should function
differently in the university setting. As I have elsewhere discussed, there
are two main underlying justifications for the ways in which the Court's
framework-comprising the four above-described cases-reduces
students' First Amendment coverage below the general baseline.20 First,
all of the cases invoke the theme of protection-the need to protect
students, and/or the functioning of the school as a whole, from
potentially damaging speech. Tinker, for instance, described the
importance of preventing substantial disruptions in school;21 Fraser and
Hazelwood both discussed the need to shield immature audiences from
speech that they were not emotionally ready to hear;22 and Morse
emphasized the need to safeguard students from speech that advocated
23drug use (such as peer pressure).
Second, almost all of the cases explicitly or implicitly invoke the
theme of education-the notion that speech restrictions themselves can
19. Id. at 247.
20. See Emily Gold Waldman, Badmouthing Authority: Hostile Speech About
School Officials and the Limits of School Restrictions, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
591, 596-98 (2011).
21. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509
(1969).
22. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhimeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-72 (1988);
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
23. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408-10 (2007).
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sometimes teach students important lessons about appropriate oral or
written discourse. Such lessons might relate to civility (as in Fraser,
where the Court specifically stated that "it was perfectly appropriate" for
schools to restrict speech "to make the point to the pupils that vulgar
speech and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent with the 'fundamental
values' of public school education",24) or to specific curricular lessons (as
in Hazelwood, where the Court endorsed the possibility of restrictions on
school-sponsored speech that is "poorly written" or "inadequately
researched25.
Both the protective and educational justifications naturally play
out differently in universities, as opposed to elementary and secondary
schools. As to protection, the Fraser and Hazelwood concerns about
exposing students to material that is inappropriate for their level of
maturity26 are basically absent in the university setting. Similarly, the
worries in Morse about the damaging effects of verbal peer pressure2 are
much more salient for minors than for students who are at least eighteen
years old. Tinker's concerns about protecting the campus from
substantial disruption28 definitely remain relevant, but the maturity of
university students (combined with the typically larger, more diffuse
nature of university campus life) means that one student's speech is often
less likely to cause widespread unrest.
The educational rationale also has a narrower reach in the
university setting. The Hazelwood notion that educators are "entitled to
exercise greater control" over school-sponsored speech "to assure that
participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach" is
29
certainly still applicable in the university classroom setting. If a
professor wants to limit the scope of a particular assignment, or give a
24. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685-86.
25. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271-72. 1 have also argued that lurking in Morse's
subtext is an educational rationale: that schools, as part of teaching students about
the gravity of drug use, should be able to convey disapproval of messages suggesting
that drug use is a joking or trivial matter. See Emily Gold Waldman, No Jokes About
Dope: Morse v. Frederick's Educational Rationale, _ UMKC L. REV.
(forthcoming _ 2013).
26. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271-72; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
27. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 408-10.
28. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510-11
(1969).
29. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271-72.
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low grade to poorly-written or inadequately-researched work, the idea
that his or her students would have a valid free speech claim is
untenable. 30 But the broader view expressed in Fraser-that speech
restrictions are also a valuable way of teaching students "the shared
values of a civilized social order"-is out of place in the university
setting.3 1 Indeed, the Fraser Court itself specifically described the
"inculcat[ion of] the habits and manners of civility" as part of the "role
32
and purpose" of K-12 public education. University students do not
need to be inculcated into becoming adult citizens; they already are.
In sum, both the protective and educational rationales counsel
toward limited application of the Court's student speech framework in
the university setting. Parts of it seem completely inapplicable; not
surprisingly, no court has yet applied Fraser or Morse to university
students. Even the potentially applicable standards from Tinker and
Hazelwood are often less likely to be satisfied. Thus, as a general matter,
university students receive greater First Amendment protection than do
their K- 12 counterparts, and this makes perfect sense.
But this generalization does not hold true-factually or
normatively-with respect to one particular cluster of student speech
cases in the university setting. This cluster involves situations where a
university is regulating student speech not to protect other students from
the speech, nor solely to teach students a lesson. Rather, the standard
protective and educational rationales are supplemented by what I call a
certification rationale. In these cases, the university is sanctioning a
student's speech largely because this speech has undermined the
university's confidence that this student is going to be an appropriate
member of the profession for which the university is training him or her.
In other words, the university is no longer comfortable letting the student
proceed down the normal path that will culminate in the university's
explicit or implicit certification of fitness for a particular profession. I
call these the "certification cases."
30. See, e.g., O'Neal v. Falcon, 668 F. Supp. 2d 979 (W.D. Tex. 2009)
(rejecting public university student's claim that her First Amendment rights were
violated when her professor did not let her write a speech about abortion for a class
assignment).
31. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681-83.
32. Id. at 681.
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A. Tatro v. University of Minnesota: A Paradigmatic Certification Case
A good example of a certification case is Tatro v. University of
Minnesota,33 just decided in June 2012. Amanda Tatro was a college
junior enrolled in the University of Minnesota's Mortuary Science
Program, which has the primary purpose of preparing students to be
licensed funeral directors and morticians.34 As part of the program,
students must take laboratory courses in anatomy, embalming, and
restorative art, and these labs use human cadavers donated for teaching
and research purposes. The course syllabus for the anatomy lab
included rules "set up to promote respect for the cadaver"; the rules
permitted respectful conversational language about cadaver dissection,
36but prohibited blogging about the anatomy lab or cadaver dissection.
At the beginning of her fall junior semester, in connection with her
enrollment in the lab courses, Tatro signed a form agreeing to comply
with these policies.37 Nonetheless, she later posted four Facebook status
updates that she subsequently described as "satirical commentary and
violent fantasy about her school experience."38 In one such post, she
commented that she "[g]ets to play, I mean dissect, Bernie today. Let's
see if I can have a lab void of reprimanding and having my scalpel taken
away. Perhaps if I just hide it in my sleeve . . . ."3 She reflected in
another post: "Who knew embalming lab was so cathartic! I still want to
stab a certain someone in the throat with a trocar though. Hmm . . .
perhaps I will spend the evening updating my 'Death List #5' and
making friends with the crematory guy. I do know the code . . . ."40 Her
other two posts had similar themes.4 1
Near the end of the semester, the Mortuary Science Program
Director learned of Tatro's posts and met with other staff members to
33. 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012).
34. Id. at 511-12.
35. Id at 512.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 511-13.
39. Id. at 512.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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discuss them.42 According to the Director, "'[t]here was a lot of fear'
surrounding Tatro's post about stabbing someone with a trocar and
hiding a scalpel in her sleeve."4 3 The Director told Tatro to stay away
from the Mortuary Science Department while the matter was investigated
by university police, who later concluded no crime had been
committed.44 In the meantime, Tatro appeared on local television to
discuss her punishment for her Facebook posts, prompting some cadaver
donor families (and members of the general public) to contact the
Anatomy Bequest Program and raise questions about her
professionalism. 45 Ultimately, although the program allowed Tatro to
return to school to take her final exams, the lab instructor submitted a
formal complaint about her to the University's Office of Student Conduct
46
and Academic Integrity.
At Tatro's subsequent hearing, faculty from the Mortuary
Science Program testified about the program's "emphasis on respect,
dignity, and professionalism as a foundation for later working as a
funeral director or mortician," and urged Tatro's expulsion from the
47program. Tatro testified that "she use[d] humor and jokes to release
anxiety and to stave off depression," explaining that she suffered from
48difficult circumstances. She acknowledged, however, that she had
known that she was restricted from writing about the details of what she
did in the lab, and conceded that others might have misunderstood her
sense of humor.49 Ultimately, the Campus Committee on Student
Behavior decided not to expel Tatro, but to impose significant sanctions
for her speech, including giving her a grade of "F" in the course, placing
42. Id. at 513.
43. Id. (alteration in original).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 513-14.
48. Id. at 514. Specifically, Tatro suffered "from a debilitating central nervous
system disease" and was serving as the primary caretaker for her mother, who was
suffering from a traumatic brain injury. Id. Tatro passed away later in 2012. See
Abby Simons, U Grad in Facebook Case Dies, STAR TRIBUNE, June 26, 2012.
49. Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 514. Confusingly, although Tatro admitted that she
knew she was restricted from writing about the details of what she did in the lab,
including on Facebook, she also "claimed not to understand that her Facebook posts
fell within the scope of the blogging prohibition." Id.
[Vol. 11I390 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIE W
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her on probation for the rest of her undergraduate career, and requiring
her to (1) complete a "directed study course" in clinical ethics, (2) write a
letter "addressing the issue of respect within the program and the
profession," and (3) undergo a psychiatric evaluation at the student
health service clinic and follow their recommendations.5 0 Tatro appealed
this decision within the university; after these efforts were unsuccessful,
she filed suit in Minnesota state court, raising a number of claims,
including a free speech argument.5' The Minnesota Supreme Court
52
ultimately granted review on her free speech claim.
In analyzing Tatro's case, the Minnesota Supreme Court
observed that neither the Tinker nor Hazelwood standards for restricting
student speech were satisfied.53 Tatro's speech did not rise to the level of
causing substantial disruption under Tinker, and the University itself had
not justified the sanction on this basis.54 Nor could the speech be
considered "school-sponsored," which is the predicate for Hazelwood to
apply; Tatro's Facebook posts were entirely her own. Yet the court still
concluded that the University of Minnesota had not violated Tatro's First
Amendment rights by punishing her speech.56 Stating that "we must
consider the special characteristics of the academic environment of the
Mortuary Science Program and its professional requirements when
deciding the standard that applies," the court adopted a new standard: "a
university does not violate the free speech rights of a student enrolled in
a professional program when the university imposes sanctions for
Facebook posts that violate academic program rules that are narrowly
tailored and directly related to established professional conduct
standards." The court further concluded that the Mortuary Science
Program's prohibition on blogging about cadavers had been directly
related to the established professional conduct standard-codified in
50. Id. at 514-15.
51. Id. at 515.
52. Id
53. See id. at 518-20.
54. See id. at 519-20.
55. See id. at 518.
56. Id. at 524.
57. Id. at 520-21.
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Minnesota law-requiring mortuary science professionals to treat the
deceased with "dignity and respect.""
Tatro is a paradigmatic certification case because neither the
protective nor educational rationales completely explain the result.
Tatro's speech did hint at violence, but not seriously enough to prompt
real concerns about protecting other individuals or the university's
functioning as a whole. Indeed, the University of Minnesota itself did
not argue in court that Tinker's substantial disruption standard applied
here.59 And while educational concerns were certainly relevant here, as
most clearly exemplified by the portion of Tatro's sanction that required
her to take a "'directed study course' in clinical ethics,,,60 they do not tell
the whole story either. Even in the K-12 context, where students' free
speech rights are more limited, courts have declined to hold that schools
can punish students for offensive off-campus speech simply to teach
them a lesson about the boundaries of appropriate discourse. Indeed,
61
several courts have explicitly rejected that notion. If, for instance, a K-
12 student wrote Facebook posts analogous to Tatro's posts-the closest
example that comes to mind, although it is not perfectly on point, is a
high-schooler writing disturbing, offensive Facebook posts about a
biology dissection experience-it is very unlikely that the school could
constitutionally punish that speech.
What makes Tatro's case different is that the school's
educational concerns were inextricably linked to certification concerns.
This was not just any student posting "satirical commentary" about a lab
exercise or classroom assignment. It was a student whom the University
of Minnesota was preparing for a career as a funeral director or
mortician, and on whom the University would ultimately bestow a
Bachelor of Science degree in this field-a prerequisite for becoming
licensed.62 Moreover, it was a student whom the University would be
placing in a clinical rotation at a funeral home-an experience which
58. Id. at 522-23.
59. See id. at 518-20.
60. 1d. at 514.
61. See, e.g., J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 932-33 (3d Cir.
2011) (en banc); T.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 779
(N.D. Ind. 2011); J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094,
1110 (C.D. Ca. 2011).
62. Tatro, 816 N.W.3d at 511-12.
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would also count toward her licensing requirements. Thus, by allowing
Tatro to continue in the Mortuary Science Program, the University of
Minnesota would be facilitating her entry into the profession and
essentially certifying her fitness for it. Clearly, Tatro's speech
undermined their confidence in doing so.M Indeed, as I discuss further in
Part II, the certification cases link up with one of Hazelwood's themes:
giving schools broader reign over student speech that may be seen as
bearing the schools' own imprimatur. Although no one would have
reasonably perceived Tatro's posts themselves as bearing the University
of Minnesota's imprimatur-the typical predicate for Hazelwood to
apply-by ultimately granting Tatro a degree from the Mortuary Science
Program, the University would have been placing its imprimatur on her
as an appropriate entrant into this profession. This certification dynamic
is what differentiates this cluster of cases within the student speech
landscape.
In addition to Tatro, there have been a number of certification
cases within the past decade. These cases divide into two main
categories. First, the majority of such cases involve situations where,
unlike in Tatro, the student's speech occurred in a sufficiently curricular
setting to trigger courts' straightforward application of Hazelwood.65
Second, two certification cases have involved situations where the
student's speech occurred during an external clinical placement and
prompted the external "employer" to dismiss the student from the clinic,
66leading to further academic ramifications. In these cases, the courts
have applied the public employee framework created by Pickering and
67its progeny. Below, I discuss both categories of cases and then circle
back to the certification cases as a whole.
63. Id. at 512.
64. Indeed, as the Tatro court observed, the "driving force" behind the
University's discipline here was Tatro's failure to comply with the program's
expectations regarding "respect, discretion, and confidentiality." Id. at 520.
65. See infra Part LB.
66. See infra Part IC.
67. See infra Part I.C.
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B. The Hazelwood Certification Cases
Several recent cases have involved students who were sanctioned
for their curricular speech-or refusal to speak-in the context of a
professional training program. In all of these cases, the courts have
applied Hazelwood. Although some have stopped short of saying that
Hazelwood applies to all school-sponsored speech in the university
setting (a standard that would include many extracurricular activities),
there is a growing consensus that Hazelwood's "reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns" standard should at least apply to
university students' curricular speech.69  But that does not mean that
universities always win here. Outcomes generally hinge on whether
courts are convinced that the university was indeed acting out of
legitimate pedagogical concerns, or whether they identify a genuine
factual dispute regarding this issue.
Two examples of cases where courts identified such a genuine
dispute for trial are Ward v. Polite,70 just decided in 2012, and Axson-
Flynn v. Johnson.7 1 The plaintiff in Ward was a student in a graduate-
level counseling program at Eastern Michigan University.72 She
repeatedly stated that her Christian faith would prevent her from
affirming clients' same-sex relationships, but the issue was not squarely
presented until-four classes shy of a degree-she enrolled in the
program's required practicum, in which she would counsel real clients.
68. See Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 2012); Keeton v.
Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 875 (11th Cir. 2011); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356
F.3d 1277, 1289 (10th Cir. 2004); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 951-52 (9th Cir.
2002).
69. See, e.g., Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1289, 1286 n.6 (holding that "the
Hazelwood framework is applicable in a university setting for speech that occurs in a
classroom as part of a class curriculum," but stating that it "need not reach any
analysis of university students' extracurricular speech"); Brown, 308 F.3d at 949
(concluding that "Hazelwood articulates the standard for reviewing a university's
assessment of a student's academic work," but declining to hold that it should also
apply to universities' regulation of speech "in the context of extracurricular
activities, such as yearbooks and newspapers" (emphasis added)).
70. 667 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. 2012).
71. 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004).
72. Ward, 667 F.3d at 730.
73. Id.
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When asked to counsel a gay client, Ward asked her faculty supervisor to
refer the client to another student, or to permit her to begin counseling
with the understanding that she could make a referral if the counseling
began to involve relationship issues.74 The faculty supervisor referred
the client, but the University commenced hearings that ultimately
resulted in Ward's termination, prompting her to bring a free speech
claim.7 5 The University's position-expressed first to Ward and later in
court-was that she had violated the American Counseling Association's
code of ethics by "imposing values that are inconsistent with counseling
goals" and "engaging in discrimination based on . . . sexual
orientation. The University further claimed that it had a "blanket rule"
prohibiting practicum students from referring any clients. 7 7 The Sixth
Circuit, however, ruled that her claim should survive summary
judgment. The court pointed out that the University's own counseling
expert had acknowledged that many counselors refer gay and lesbian
clients for relationship counseling, that the University could not point to
any evidence of its purported blanket rule against referrals, and that at
least one student had previously been allowed to refer a client during the
practicum. 79 The Court concluded that "[a] reasonable jury could find
that the university dismissed Ward from its counseling program because
of her faith-based speech, not because of any legitimate pedagogical
objective."80
Similarly, Axson-Flynn involved a Mormon student who was
encouraged to withdraw from the University of Utah's Actor Training
Program after repeatedly refusing to say the word "fuck" or to take
God's name in vain during classroom acting exercises." In defending
74. Id. at 730.
75. Id. at 730-32.
76. Id. at 731.
77. Id. at 736.
78. Id. at 738.
79. Id. at 736-37.
80. Id. at 738. Ward also brought a free exercise claim, which the court
likewise held should survive summary judgment. Id. at 738-41. Such claims, which
were also brought in several of the other cases discussed below, are beyond the
scope of this Article, which is exclusively focused on the speech issues raised by
these cases.
81. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 2004). Axson-
Flynn also brought a free exercise claim, which the court stated could have survived
20131 UNIVERSITY IMPRIMATURS 395
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itself against the student's subsequent free speech claim, the University
argued that requiring students to perform acting exercises precisely as
written constituted part of its "methodology for preparing students for
careers in professional acting," explaining that this taught students to
step outside their own persona, preserve the integrity of the author's
work, and to use "true acting skills." 8 2 Indeed, they noted that they
specifically used text with offensive language as a "teaching tool" for
students. The Tenth Circuit, however, pointed to some professors'
comments that the student should "talk to some other Mormon girls who
are good Mormons, who don't have a problem with this" to find that
there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the University's
articulation of the script adherence requirement was actually a pretext for
84
religious discrimination.
Other courts have been more persuaded by universities' stated
pedagogical reasons for sanctioning the speech of students in
85professional training programs. In Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled against a counseling
student who withdrew from Augusta State University after being
required to participate in a "remediation plan" as a prerequisite for
participating in a required clinical practicum.86 Keeton, who was seeking
her master's degree in school counseling, had stated in class that she
planned to try to convert students from being homosexual to
heterosexual, and would tell them that homosexual behavior was morally
wrong and that "it was not okay to be gay." University officials
concluded that she had expressed her intent to violate several provisions
of the American Counseling Association's Code of Ethics, which, as
summary judgment were it not for the defendants' qualified immunity here. Id. at
1294-1301.
82. Id. at 1291.
83. Id. at 1292 n.10.
84. Id at 1282, 1293.
85. 664 F.3d 865 (11 th Cir. 2011).
86. Id at 867. The Eleventh Circuit made this ruling in the context of the
student's bid for a preliminary injunction. Id. at 868. As in Ward and Axson-Flynn,
the student also brought a free exercise claim. Id at 867. The court ultimately
rejected that claim for reasons similar to its rejection of her free speech claim. Id. at
879-80.
87. Id. at 868-69.
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noted above, prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation.
They thus told her that she could not participate in the clinical practicum,
in which she would be counseling a student, unless she followed a
remediation plan that included requiring her to "work to increase her
exposure and interaction with the [gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender,
and queer/questioning (GLBTQ)] population," attend workshops on
diversity, read articles about counseling the GLBTQ population, and
submit monthly reflection statements. Claiming that she would not be
able to successfully complete this remediation program, Keeton
withdrew and filed suit.90 The Eleventh Circuit ruled that she was
unlikely to succeed in her free speech claim, concluding that the
University had imposed the remediation plan not because of her
''personal religious views on homosexuality," but due to its "legitimate
pedagogical concern in teaching its students to comply with the ACA
Code of Ethics." 91
The Ninth Circuit likewise ruled in favor of the University of
California at Santa Barbara in Brown v. Li,92 where a master's degree
candidate sued after a university committee refused to approve his thesis,
which included a "Disacknowledgements" section that "offer[ed] special
Fuck You's" to various administrators and staff at the University.93 The
court reasoned that the university committee's "decision was reasonably
related to a legitimate pedagogical objective: teaching Plaintiff the
proper format for a scientific paper," noting that the student had received
"reasonable standards for that assignment, including a pedagogically
appropriate requirement that the thesis comply with professional
standards governing his discipline." 9 4 The court further observed-in a
passage I return to below-that "the committee members had an
affirmative First Amendment right not to approve Plaintiffs thesis,"
88. Id. at 869.
89. Id. at 869-70.
90. Id. at 871.
91. Id. at 872-76.
92. 308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002).
93. Id. at 943-44. The student was enrolled in the Department of Material
Sciences at the University of California at Santa Barbara, and his thesis was entitled
"The Morphology of Calcium Carbonate: Factors Affecting Crystal Shape." Id. at
941-43.
94. Id. at 952.
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given that their names would appear in the thesis and could be seen as
jointly responsible for its content.95
C. The Pickering Certification Cases
In Ward and Keeton, university officials themselves took action
when they foresaw potential problems with placing their students into
clinical practice settings. But what if they had placed the students, only
to receive subsequent complaints from the field? In both Watts v.
Florida International University and Snyder v. Millersville
University,97 that is precisely what occurred.
Watts involved a student in a Master of Social Work Program
who was assigned to perform his required practicum at a psychiatric
hospital, which subsequently terminated him for two incidents of
"inappropriate behavior related to patients regarding religion."98 The
nature of the first incident was unclear; in the second, he apparently told
a patient that one place she could find a bereavement support group was
"church." 99 After being terminated from the hospital, he was dismissed
from the related seminar in which he was enrolled; because these were
requirements for receiving his degree, the student was unable to earn his
master's degree. 0
Similarly, Snyder involved a student enrolled in a Bachelor of
Science in Education program who was assigned to perform her required
student teaching practicum at a local high school, which ultimately
decided to bar her from campus because of various concerns about her
95. Id. As compared to the other cases discussed in this Article, this case is
less clearly a certification case, in that it is not clear precisely what profession the
university was preparing this student for, nor is it clear precisely to what extent the
university's actions here stemmed from doubts about whether he would be a fit
member of that profession. That said, the court's description of these actions as
stemming from concern that the student's work did not comply with "professional
standards," as well as its further discussion of the committee members' desire not to
"approve"-essentially certify-the student's work, arguably bring this case into the
certification realm.
96. 495 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2007).
97. No. 07-1660, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97943 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008).
98. Watts, 495 F.3d at 1291-92.
99. Id. at 1292.
100. Id.
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job performance. In particular, the school objected to various posts
that she had made to her MySpace webpage, including a post that
referred to her faculty supervisor and a post featuring a photograph of her
wearing a pirate hat and holding a plastic cup, captioned "drunken
pirate.,,102 Because the student was removed from the practicum before it
ended, she could not receive a passing grade in the accompanying
Student Teaching course, and thus she was unable to receive her
education degree. 103
Both students brought free speech claims against their
universities, and in both cases, the courts looked to the same framework:
the government employee speech framework created by the Supreme
Court's trilogy of Pickering v. Board of Education,0 4 Connick v.
Myers, o0 and Garcetti v. Ceballos.106 Pursuant to these cases,
government employees whose employer sanctions them for their speech
have valid free speech claims only if they can first show that they were
speaking as citizens on matters of public concern. 10 7 This is often a
difficult threshold to meet, and indeed the students in both Watts and
Snyder argued that they should not be subjected to it, since they were not
employees suing their employers, but rather students suing their
universities. os They therefore suggested that the student speech
framework should instead apply to their cases.1o9 The courts rejected
their arguments, however, holding that for purposes of the clinical
placements, the students had essentially been functioning as
employees.no Accordingly, the Pickering framework applied, and
101. Snyder, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97943, at *7, *17-18.
102. Id. at *14-22.
103. Id. at *22.
104. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
105. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
106. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
107. See id. at 418.
108. See Watts v. Fla. Int'l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1293-94 (11 th Cir. 2007);
Snyder, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97943, at *39-42.
109. See Watts, 495 F.3d at 1293-94; Snyder, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97943,
at *39-42.
110. See Watts, 495 F.3d at 1293-94; Snyder, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97943,
at *39-42.
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because neither student was found to be speaking on matters of public
concern, they both lost."'
The Watts and Snyder courts did not undertake a separate inquiry
into whether the universities had been motivated by a legitimate
pedagogical concern in withholding the students' degrees, or even into
whether the relevant university officials agreed that the students'
performance was poor enough to warrant termination."1 Instead, the
courts presented the consequences as inevitable. The Eleventh Circuit
wrote that "once Watts the employee was terminated from his
employment in the practicum, Watts the student could not complete the
course which included the practicum. Without the course he could not
earn his degree." 1 l3 Similarly, the Snyder court observed that "[n]o one
at MU had anything to do with th[e] decision [by the school district to
bar Snyder from campus]. Once [the school district] did not allow
Plaintiff to complete the practicum, however, MU could not award
Plaintiff a BSE degree." 1 4
111. See Watts, 495 F.3d at 1293-94; Snyder, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97943,
at *39-42. The Watts court, however, did hold that Watts' related free exercise
claim could survive the defendants' (12)(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Watts, 495 F.3d at
1294-1300.
112. In fact, as discussed below, the Watts court implied that Watts'
performance had complied with the university program's guidelines. Watts, 495 F.3d
at 1292 ("Nothing he said violated any guidelines or requirements of the MSW
program."). The Snyder record is more mixed. On the one hand, Snyder's university
supervisor during her time at the school district gave her good evaluations in certain
categories, and rated her overall performance as satisfactory. Snyder, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 97943, at *10. University officials also seemed to sympathize with her
predicament and made efforts to ensure that she could still graduate from the
university, albeit with a B.A. in English instead of a B.S.E. Id. at *22-24. On the
other hand, her university supervisor did give her a final "unsatisfactory" rating in
one category, and Snyder would have needed satisfactory ratings in all categories
before the university could recommend her for a teaching certification. Id. at *20-
21, *25. That said, by that point, the school district had already decided to bar her
from campus. Id at *17. In any event, it is clear that the district court did not
attempt to evaluate, under Hazelwood, whether the University's decision here had
been reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.
113. Watts, 495 F.3d at 1294.
114. Snyder, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97943, at *22.
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To some extent, the various certification cases coalesce into a
coherent (albeit somewhat ad hoc) framework. When a student's speech
undermines the university's confidence that he or she will be an
appropriate member of the profession for which the university is training
him or her, the university can impose a sanction if either (1) the speech
violated program rules that were closely tied to established professional
conduct standards;." (2) the speech was curricular (provided that the
university's response stemmed from a legitimate pedagogical
concern);' 1 6 or (3) the sanction flowed directly from an external entity's
refusal to let the student fulfill a required part of the program (provided
that the external entity's decision was not itself unlawful).117
Embedded within this framework, however, are some tough
questions. First, to what extent does a university's disapproval of how a
particular student intends to perform the profession for which the
university is providing training qualify as a legitimate pedagogical
concern? Keeton and Ward, which both involved universities who
ejected counseling students with anti-gay views but which reached
opposite conclusions, illustrate this tension. The Keeton court, for
instance, concluded that Augusta State University had not singled out the
plaintiff student "for disfavored treatment because of her point of view,"
115. See, e.g., Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 514 (Minn. 2012)
(holding that sanctions against a mortuary student for posting allegedly satirical
information on Facebook about her profession were valid pursuant to program rules
which she had violated).
116. See, e.g., Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 2012) (providing
that educational institutions at every level must have latitude to achieve legitimate
curricular objectives); Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 877 (11th Cir.
2011) (emphasizing the deference that courts must show to a school's curricular
choices); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1292 (10th Cir. 2004) (explaining
that a school's methodology regarding curriculum may be "reasonably related" to
pedagogical concerns); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 951 (9th Cir. 2002) (agreeing
with the Supreme Court that a university's control over curricular speech is broader
than a primary and secondary schools' control).
117. See, e.g., Watts, 495 F.3d at 1300 (holding that free speech rights of a
graduate student were not violated when dismissed from his practicum for telling a
patient about his Catholicism); Snyder, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97943, at *29
(denying a prospective teacher's request for reinstatement to her practicum after
being released for posting a photograph of herself on the Internet).
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but rather because of concerns regarding her "ability to be a
multiculturally competent counselor."' The university's concerns about
the student's ability to be such a competent counselor, however,
stemmed directly from her point of view about homosexuality. These
two alternative explanations were thus in fact tightly linked. The Ward
court likewise suggested that there were two neatly separable
alternatives: either the university had ejected the plaintiff student from
the counseling program "due to a policy against referrals" or "because of
hostility toward her speech and faith."" 9 But if the university had
unambiguously asserted that it permitted referrals for certain reasons
(such as allowing grieving students to avoid counseling grieving clients),
but not for others (such as accommodating students' disapproval of
homosexuality, whether for faith-based reasons or otherwise), on which
side of the line would it have fallen? Both courts reduced the cases to
dichotomies that were more simplistic than the actual facts.12 0
Second, many certification cases involve placements-either
anticipated or actual-in clinical practicum settings. If, as in Watts and
Snyder, it is the external placement supervisor who sanctions the student
for her speech, and the university consequences flow directly from that
punishment, should the case be viewed as an employee speech case or a
student speech case? Both Watts and Snyder quickly concluded that the
public employee speech framework should apply, without real discussion
of whether the university should still have to justify its response under
the student speech standards.
118. Keeton, 664 F.3d at 873-74.
119. Ward, 667 F.3d at 730.
120. Indeed, although these cases might seem "like polar opposites," as the
Ward court noted, given that Keeton lost her bid for a preliminary injunction while
Ward survived summary judgment, id. at 741, the courts' analytical approach for
considering them was actually quite similar. See id. at 741. Also, as the Ward court
took pains to point out, the student in Keeton had clearly taken a more aggressive
stance, not merely seeking to refer gay students who were dealing with relationship
issues, but insisting that she would try to convert them. Id. at 736. Thus, it seems
likely that had the Ward court been faced with the facts in Keeton, it would have
reached the same result. Id. at 741 (noting that Keeton's proposed approach for
counseling gay students, "all agree, violates the ACA code of ethics by imposing a
counselor's values on a client, a form of conduct the university is free to prohibit as
part of its curriculum").
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Finally, the student speech framework generally rests on a sharp
distinction between school-sponsored student speech (curricular or
otherwise) and independent student speech, with a further line being
drawn between whether that speech originates on or off campus. How
relevant are these issues when the certification dynamic is present? If a
student enrolled in a university training program utters speech that
convinces university officials that he or she will not be a fit member of
the profession, to what extent should it matter where that speech took
place?
This is not intended to be an exhaustive list of questions. Rather,
my intent here is to highlight some of the tricky questions that the
certification dynamic raises, in order to step back, think more broadly
about what the implications of this dynamic should be, and propose some
principles for a more unified approach. To do this, I now turn to the
three related areas of law that the certification dynamic implicates: (1)
Hazelwood's imprimatur concept; (2) the general notion of educational
deference to universities; and (3) the public employment analogy.
II. HAZEL WOOD'S "IMPRIMATUR" CONCEPT
Hazelwood is an important starting point for thinking about the
certification dynamic. Not only is Hazelwood applied in certification
cases involving curricular speech, but its approach has broader relevance
to all certification cases.
Hazelwood itself was not a certification case. It involved a
principal's decision to remove two pages from a high school
newspaper-which was produced by the school's "Journalism II" class
and received school funding-because those pages included articles
about divorce and teen pregnancy. 121 The principal justified this
censorship with both protective and educational rationales: he wanted to
shield younger students from exposure to these topics, and believed that
the student authors had not followed applicable principles of
journalism.122  The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the school,
distinguishing between "a student's personal expression that happens to
occur on the school premises" from student speech disseminated through
121. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhimeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263 (1988).
122. Id. at 264-65.
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"school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other
expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public
might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school."l23 The
Court concluded that "[e]ducators are entitled to exercise greater control
over this second form of student expression to assure that participants
learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or
listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their
level of maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker are not
erroneously attributed to the school." 24 It thus held that school officials'
restrictions on such school-sponsored speech would be upheld as long as
they were "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."l 25
As noted above, there is a growing trend toward applying
Hazelwood in the university setting, at least in the context of university
students' curricular speech. Such application is not limited to the
certification cases; a recent decision, for instance, applied Hazelwood to
rule against a student who challenged a professor's limitation of topics
for a speech-writing assignment.126 The certification cases, however,
raise more difficult questions about what qualifies as a legitimate
pedagogical concern. Fundamentally, these cases ask whether, when
universities are training and certifying students for a particular
profession, they have a legitimate pedagogical interest in weeding out
students whose speech undermines the university's confidence in them as
future professionals. Although such losses of confidence do not always
result from university officials' disagreement with the student's
underlying views-in Tatro, for instance, the university officials seemed
more concerned about the student's judgment and maturity than about
any "views" she expressedl 2 7-they frequently do, thus implicating the
larger question of whether Hazelwood permits viewpoint discrimination.
I have elsewhere argued that Hazelwood does contemplate
viewpoint discrimination, as most clearly suggested by the Hazelwood
Court's statement that schools must retain the ability to censor school-
sponsored speech that "might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug
123. Id at 271.
124. Id
125. Id at 273.
126. See O'Neal v. Falcon, 668 F. Supp. 2d 979 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
127. Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012).
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or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent with
'the shared values of a civilized social order."' 1 2 8 Moreover, in the
certification context, the argument for allowing viewpoint discrimination
under Hazelwood is particularly strong. Hazelwood repeatedly
emphasized that schools should have broad reign over student speech
that might reasonably be seen as bearing the school's own imprimatur.129
Not only did Hazelwood initially characterize the issue as involving
"educators' authority over school-sponsored . .. expressive activities that
students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive
to bear the imprimatur of the school," but it later referred to the school's
related need to ensure "that the views of the individual speaker are not
erroneously attributed to the school."'
30
This "imprimatur" concept has important resonance in the
certification cases, where the school is placing its imprimatur on students
themselves, certifying that they are appropriate entrants into the
profession for which the university has trained them. Given this high
degree of imprimatur, professional-training programs have a legitimate
interest in ensuring that their graduates will adhere to the programs' own
standards, even if viewpoint-based, of competence and professionalism.
Of course, universities have no way of controlling how their graduates
actually act once they depart with their university-issued degree. But
when a student's speech prompts concern while he or she is still enrolled,
it is legitimate for a university to respond, even if that concern stems
from disagreement with the substantive viewpoints expressed by the
student.
Indeed, by facilitating professional students' entry into the field
(and often, as a precursor, facilitating their placements in clinical practice
settings), the university is engaging in its own sort of speech. The Ninth
Circuit made a related point in Brown v. Li, where, in holding that the
university did not violate a graduate student's speech rights by refusing
to approve his thesis, it stated that "the committee members had an
128. Emily Gold Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood 's Core: A New Approach
to Restrictions on School-Sponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. REv. 63, 110 (2008)
(quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272).
129. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271-73.
130. Id. at 271. The Court then returned to this concept again, relatedly
asserting that the school should be able to avoid being associated with particular
political positions. Id. at 272.
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affirmative First Amendment right not to approve Plaintiffs thesis. That
is especially true where, as here, the committee members' names appear
in the thesis and where, according to the [university] Guide, they are
jointly responsible for its content." 13 1 Of course, not all certification
cases involve situations where particular university officials' names are
actually being listed alongside student speech. At a minimum, however,
the university-by letting professional students continue down a path to
graduation and ultimately granting them a degree-is approving these
students as fit to enter the profession.
As such, although Hazelwood will usually point toward more
speech protection in the university setting-the universe of legitimate
pedagogical concerns is obviously narrower here, given the
inapplicability of maturity-related concerns-the certification cases
create a narrow exception where Hazelwood actually points toward less
speech protection. In the K-12 setting, and indeed in many university
settings, a student's graduation is much less suggestive of school
imprimatur. It simply indicates that the student fulfilled the academic
requirements of the program. Where students are receiving professional
training from a university, by contrast, their ultimate degree bespeaks
school approval of them.
Indeed, Hazelwood's focus on schools' ability to preserve
control over the placement and perception of their imprimatur even calls
into question-for purposes of the certification cases-the relevance of
the distinction between curricular and non-curricular speech. This
distinction certainly makes sense in the absence of the certification
dynamic. If a high school student utters purely independent speech, as
opposed to speech in a school-sponsored setting, no reasonable listener
would think that the school had placed its imprimatur on that speech-or
on that student. But if a professional student's non-curricular speech
seriously undermines a university's confidence that he or she will be an
appropriate member of the profession, the university does have reason
for concern about letting the student proceed down a path toward school
imprimatur of his or her fitness for the profession. This is why, even
though the Tatro court rightly concluded that Hazelwood did not literally
apply to Tatro's Facebook posts, which no one would have thought were
131. Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 952 (9th Cir. 2002).
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school-sponsored, the underlying reasoning of Hazelwood supported the
court's ruling in the university's favor.1 3 2
That said, Hazelwood does not suggest that schools' power over
school-sponsored student speech-let alone other speech by students
who will receive a degree conveying school approval of their fitness for a
profession-should be unlimited. Hazelwood makes clear that the
speech sanction must result from legitimate pedagogical concerns.133
Although I have argued that the viewpoint-based nature of a pedagogical
concern does not automatically render it illegitimate, schools should still
have to articulate the nature of their concern and explain why it was
indeed legitimate in light of professional standards and expectations.
Courts should make these determinations, as I discuss below, with a
significant but not unlimited degree of educational deference.
III. UNIVERSITY DEFERENCE
The question of how much deference should apply in the
certification cases fits into a broader discussion, in both the case law and
academic commentary, about the appropriate level of judicial deference
to universities in general. This literature extends far beyond student
speech controversies, encompassing issues including affirmative action
in admissions, tenure decisions, and accommodations for learning
disabilities.134
A central starting point, dating back several centuries, is that
universities enjoy a substantial degree of autonomy. Writing that
"[p]ractical autonomy from government control has characterized
American colleges and universities" at least since the beginning of the
nineteenth century, J. Peter Byrne explains that over the course of that
century, "American law came to recognize two legal bases for university
autonomy: the common law notion of academic abstention and state
constitutional status for state universities." 3 5  These bases, in turn,
132. See Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 518 (Minn. 2012).
133. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
134. Examples of disputes in such areas include, respectively, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Brown v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 891 F.2d 337 (1st Cir.
1989); Guckenberger v. Bos. Univ., 8 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D. Mass. 1998).
135. J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First
Amendment, " 99 YALE L.J. 251, 321-22 (1989).
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became "precursors of the modem federal constitutional protection of
institutional autonomy"-namely, the "principle that regulation should
not proceed so far as to deprive the university of control over its
academic destiny."l 3 6  This notion of university autonomy over its
"academic destiny" has surfaced in numerous Supreme Court cases,
including Grutter v. Bollinger,'37 where in the course of upholding the
constitutionality of University of Michigan Law School's race-conscious
admissions policy, the Court stated that
[t]he Law School's educational judgment that such
diversity is essential to its educational mission is
one to which we defer .... Our holding today is in
keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of
deference to a university's academic decisions,
within constitutionally prescribed limits. We have
long recognized that, given the important purpose
of public education and the expansive freedoms of
speech and thought associated with the university
environment, universities occupy a special niche in
our constitutional tradition. 138
Such deference to universities is not absolute. As Grutter
indicates, the Supreme Court has been less deferential to decisions that
are not purely academic.1 39 Subsequently, for instance, in Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR),'40 the Court
did not defer to a group of schools' argument that their anti-
discrimination policies entitled them to defy the Solomon Amendment's
requirement of permitting military recruiters on their campus.141 Indeed,
the Court did not even suggest that Grutter-type deference might apply
here, and unanimously rejected the law schools' various arguments that
permitting the military recruiters on their campus would conflict with
their own expressive interests.14 2 Byrne argues that FAIR came out the
right way, asserting that "the sphere of autonomy protected by the right
136. Id. at 330.
137. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
138. Id. at 328-29 (citations omitted).
139. See id.
140. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
141. Id. at 69-70.
142. Id.
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must be limited to core academic areas ... broader claims to autonomy
based on academic freedom, such as those advanced in [FAIR] for
employer recruitment policies, both lack merit and may imperil the basic
right."'
43
When the decision is academic, however, the Supreme Court has
shown significant deference, as exemplified not only by Grutter, but in
two earlier cases more factually similar to the above-described
certification cases: Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v.
Horowitzl44 and Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing.1 In
Horowitz, a student who was dismissed from medical school for failure
to meet academic standards brought a due process claim, alleging that the
university had not provided her with appropriate procedures before
dismissing her.146 Assuming arguendo that the student had a liberty or
property interest in the continuation of her education, the Court ruled that
the school had provided her with adequate process-namely, informing
her of their dissatisfaction with her progress, obtaining reports about her
from the various physicians who were supervising her, and giving her the
opportunity to appeal the decision in writing-and that a formal hearing
was not necessary.147 The Horowitz Court explained:
The decision to dismiss [this student] rested on the
academic judgment of school officials that she did
not have the necessary clinical ability to perform
adequately as a medical doctor and was making
insufficient progress toward that goal. Such a
judgment is by its nature more subjective and
evaluative than the typical factual questions
presented in the average disciplinary decision ....
Under such circumstances, we decline to ignore the
historic judgment of educators and thereby
formalize the academic dismissal process by
requiring a hearing . . . . This is especially true as
143. J. Peter Byrne, Constitutional Academic Freedom After Grutter: Getting
Real About the "Four Freedoms of a University," 77 U. COLO. L. REv. 929, 930
(2006).
144. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
145. 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
146. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 79-82.
147. Id. at 84-85.
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one advances through the varying regimes of the
educational system, and the instruction becomes
both more individualized and more specialized. 148
Similarly, Ewing involved an unsuccessful due process claim brought by
a medical student who asserted that his dismissal from the program had
been arbitrary.149 Noting the evidence that "the faculty's decision was
made conscientiously and with careful deliberation," 5 0 the Court opined:
When judges are asked to review the substance of a
genuinely academic decision, such as this one, they
should show great respect for the faculty's
professional judgment. Plainly, they may not
override it unless it is such a substantial departure
from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate
that the person or committee responsible did not
actually exercise professional judgment.15 1
The relevance of Horowitz and Ewing to the certification-related speech
claims is clear. Indeed, the Court's language about respecting university
faculty's judgment in making academic decisions, particularly in the
context of advanced, specialized educational programs, is particularly on
point. The distinction, of course, is that neither Horowitz nor Ewing
involved a student's free speech challenge. The plaintiff students there
were simply focused on the process they had received. Indeed, the facts
suggest that their universities' loss of confidence in their fitness had not
stemmed from their speech. That said, the principles that emerge from
Horowitz and Ewing-both their endorsement of significant academic
deference, and their recognition of appropriate limitations on that
deference (i.e., when the university has substantially departed from
applicable norms, or has failed to engage in careful deliberations or
provide the student with appropriate process)-are important guideposts
in considering the certification cases.
The academic literature exploring the justifications for university
autonomy and educational deference also provides useful insights into
the certification cases. Paul Horwitz, a strong proponent of university
148. Id. at 89-90.
149. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 215.
150. Id. at 225.
151. Id. (internal footnote omitted).
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autonomy, argues that universities-along with certain other entities-
should be considered "First Amendment institutions," which he describes
as "institutions that play a significant role in contributing to public
discourse, and that are both institutionally distinct and largely self-
regulating according to a set of internally generated norms, practices, and
traditions." 52 In exploring what the treatment of universities as First
Amendment institutions would entail, Horwitz articulates three
possibilities: a weak-form treatment, a medium-form treatment, and a
strong-form treatment. 5 3 The weak-form version would "counsel a fair
degree of deference on the part of courts dealing with disputes involving
core academic functions," such as "whether to discipline or expel a
student" but would be somewhat less deferential to the university's
decisions in other areas.154 The medium-form version would more
clearly ground such deference in the "special institutional status of the
university under the First Amendment."' Finally, the strong-form
version would treat universities as presumptively "legally autonomous
institutions," rather than "simply weigh[ing] their interests heavily in the
balance," such that even decisions like FAIR might come out
differently.156 Horwitz's favored approach leans toward the stronger end
of the spectrum; he concludes that "the benefits of defining a broad scope
of autonomy for universities . . . outweigh the potential risks,"157 both
because such deference may lead to a more robust dialogue "within and
between universities about their educational missions and about the
meaning of academic freedom,"',5' and because "most universities, even
if granted considerable legal autonomy, would still observe most of the
civic norms . . . usually enforced through the law." 59
152. Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy
Answers and Some Hard Questions, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1497 (2007)
[hereinafter Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions]. See also Paul
Horwitz, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (2012); Paul Horwitz, Grutter's First
Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461 (2005).
153. See Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note
152, at 1516.
154. Id. at 1516-17.
155. Id. at 1517-18.
156. Id. at 1519-20.
157. Id. at 1544.
158. Id. at 1549.
159. Id. at 1543.
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What is notable is that even under the weak-form treatment of
universities as First Amendment institutions-which Horwitz views as
"fairly close to the law as it currently stands"-the certification cases
would trigger a high degree of deference, given that they reflect
academic decisions that connect up with the university's own sense of
mission and identity.'so Similarly, Frederick Schauer, a major proponent
of institution-specific First Amendment doctrine, endorses an
institutional understanding of academic freedom, pursuant to which a
university has the right "to make its own academic decisions, even if
those decisions might, when made by a public college or university,
constitute otherwise constitutionally problematic content-based or even
viewpoint-based decisions."l61 This, too, points in the direction of
substantial deference in the certification cases.
Indeed, even skeptics of broad claims of university autonomy
tend to agree that universities should receive substantial deference in
making core academic decisions. A key question, however, is the extent
to which those decisions should receive protection even when they are
intertwined with ideology. Although Schauer and Horwitz are less
concerned by university decisions that may reflect viewpoint
discrimination, Erica Goldberg and Kelly Sarabyn have argued that that
"[t]here is little justification for affording academic protection to
decisions that are not academic in nature, but rather ideological."1 62
They further suggest that in cases where "it is difficult to distinguish an
academic decision from an ideological one," courts should examine "the
process by which a university's decision was made," deferring more
when assessments were conducted. in accordance with "the standards of a
particular academic field."'63 This argument echoes not only the
Supreme Court's emphases on process in Ewing and Horowitz, but even
160. Id. at 1516.
161. Frederick Schauer, Is There a Right to Academic Freedom?, 77 U. COLO.
L. REv. 907, 923-24 (2006); see also Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and
the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1998) (arguing, generally, in favor of a
more institution-specific approach to the First Amendment); Frederick Schauer,
Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256 (2005) (same).
162. Erica Goldberg & Kelly Sarabyn, Measuring a "Degree of Deference":
Institutional Academic Freedom in a Post-Grutter World, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
217, 239-40 (2011).
163. Id. at 245-46.
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Horwitz's own suggestion that universities, in exchange for receiving
significant deference, have their own internal obligations (even if not
judicially-enforced) to "seriously consider just what their own sense of
their academic mission entails and act accordingly," engage in good-
faith deliberations, reason thoughtfully toward their conclusions, and
observe a minimum level of appropriate process.6
The central themes emerging from the university deference
literature thus point, like Hazelwood, toward significant deference in the
certification cases. Indeed, Hazelwood and the larger concept of
university deference overlap in important and illuminating ways. Both
Hazelwood and the university deference cases share the notion of
deferring to school decisions that are primarily academic, provided that
they meet a basic threshold of pedagogical legitimacy. Additionally,
both endorse the idea that schools can make such academic decisions in
connection with their own institutional definitions of their educational
missions-a concept clearly implicated by the certification cases.
Finally, although both lines of case law stop short of explicitly endorsing
schools' authority to make viewpoint-based decisions, their reasoning
arguably points in that direction.
In fact, shortly after Hazelwood was decided, Bruce Hafen
identified the connection between Hazelwood and the Court's university
deference cases. Hafen observed:
This decision [in Hazelwood] reinforcing the
institutional authority of schools also reflects the
Court's developing perspective on the general role
of first amendment institutions. The Hazelwood
Court rejected students' claims to individual
freedom of expression in favor of educators' broad
164. Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 152 at
1555.
165. Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1061,
1101-02 (2008). See also Horwitz, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS, supra note
152, at 117 ("A purely arbitrary decision taken by the university is not suitable for
academic autonomy and judicial deference. But one that shows evidence of the
exercise of academic judgment requires courts to defer to the university's
institutional autonomy, even if other universities would decide differently.").
166. Bruce C. Hafen, Comment, Hazelwood School District and The Role of
First Amendment Institutions, 1988 DUKE L.J. 685 (1988).
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authority to define and supervise the educational
mission of public schools both in and out of the
classroom ... Hazelwood's deferential approach in
an area where limitations on expression have
become highly suspect-newspapers-reflects the
Court's emerging recognition of the affirmative
role of certain intermediate institutions in first
amendment theory.
The Court's new emphasis on first amendment
institutions seems to arise . . . from an
understanding that first amendment institutions qua
institutions can sustain conditions that nourish such
values as those associated with religion and
.167
expression.
Hafen further pointed out that "Hazelwood echoes the Court's highly
deferential treatment of institutional academic freedom in Regents of the
University of Michigan v. Ewing."l 68
Hazelwood and the university deference cases thus provide
important, converging insights into the university certification cases.
Before proposing a more unified framework, however, I want to turn to
the last key strand of law here: the Supreme Court's approach for
analyzing speech claims brought by public employees.
IV. THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT ANALOGY
The legal framework for public employees' speech claims is
relevant to the certification cases in two ways. First, as in Watts and
Snyder, this standard is sometimes itself used to resolve such cases.
More broadly, the reasoning behind this employment-based framework
provides an additional lens for considering the certification cases as a
whole, given that these cases specifically involve students who are being
trained for professions.
As noted above, the framework for evaluating public employees'
speech claims stems from three cases: Pickering, Connick, and Garcetti.
Taken together, these cases create a two-pronged test. First, public
167. Id. at 685-86 (internal footnote omitted).
168. Id. at 697.
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employees sanctioned by their employer for their speech must show that
they were speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern. If they
were speaking pursuant to their official job duties-such as a prosecutor
writing a memo about a case-their claim automatically fails. 16 Second,
if they can satisfy that threshold, the employees' interest in the speech is
then weighed against their supervisors' interest in responding to it, i.e.,
the extent to which the speech had the potential to affect the operations
of the workplace. 70 In justifying this framework, the Supreme Court has
explained-regarding prong one-that "[r]estricting speech that owes its
existence to a public employee's professional responsibilities does not
infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private
citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the
employer itself has commissioned or created."' 7' As to prong two, the
Court has identified several reasons why an employer might have a
genuine need-stemming from concerns about the efficient functioning
of the workplace-to sanction an employee's speech, even assuming that
the employee was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern.
One such reason, identified hypothetically in Pickering, is that the
employee's statements "are so without foundation as to call into question
his fitness to perform his duties"-in which case the statements are
serving as evidence of "general competence, or lack thereof," rather than
as "an independent basis for dismissal."l 72
Although the first prong of Pickering-Connick-Garcetti is what
has actually been used to dismiss certification cases like Watts and
Snyder-where the courts held that the students' speech in practicum
settings had been uttered in their capacity as employees-the second
prong is even more relevant to the certification cases as a whole. Just as
Pickering contemplated that an employer might be justified in
sanctioning an employee for speech that undermines the employer's
confidence in the employee's general competence and fitness for the job,
the universities here are sanctioning students for speech that undermines
169. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). Garcetti further
clarified that the claim should fail at this step even if the speech was on a matter of
public concern, and that the central question here is whether the employee's speech
constituted performance of his or her job. Id. at 421-23.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 421-22.
172. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 n.5 (1968).
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the universities' confidence that the students will ultimately be fit for the
professions in question. The Pickering-Connick-Garcetti framework
thus suggests that-to the extent that we view students in professional
training programs as akin to employees-their speech claims rest on
shaky ground. Relatedly, Lawrence Rosenthal has pointed to the
conceptual link between Garcetti and various university deference cases,
noting that Garcetti endorses a concept of "managerial prerogative" that
is similar to the "institutional approach to academic freedom" in
Ewing. 
173
That said, the students in certification cases are not yet
employees, and their universities are not their employers. Although
these students are adults, and universities do not have the same
inculcative responsibilities toward them as K-12 public schools have
toward their students, the nature of the student-university relationship is
still fundamentally educational. Employers hire employees to perform
jobs and assume their fitness for the profession; a university has taken on
the responsibility to train its students to become fit for the profession.
The expectations are very different here, and wholesale importation of
the public employment framework into the certification cases is
inappropriate.
This is true even when, as in Watts and Snyder, the university
consequences for a student's speech flow directly from the sanctions
imposed by outside placements. In both cases, the courts were too quick
to assume that because the Pickering-Connick-Garcetti framework
would apply had the students sued their "employers" directly, it should
similarly apply to related university sanctions. Indeed, the Snyder court
seemed to view the plaintiff student with suspicion, describing her as
having made a "strategic choice"l7 4 to sue her university rather than the
school district where she was a student teacher. This does "not alter
173. Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial
Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 97-100 (2008). Rosenthal further observes
that the "public university falls well within the scope of First Amendment
managerial prerogative-institutions of higher education must necessarily evaluate
the content and quality of speech in order to perform their function. Grading is the
most obvious example." Id. at 100. Additionally, Rosenthal briefly alludes to the
links between "managerial prerogative" and Hazelwood Id. at 94.
174. Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97943,
at *41 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008).
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[our] analysis," 75 the court concluded. Similarly, the Watts court stated
that "[h]ad Watts not been a student as well as a governmental employee,
the state plainly would have been entitled to the greater leeway the
Pickering test affords it.""'7  But had Watts not been a student, he never
would have been in this clinical practicum at all. These students' clinical
practice experiences were inextricably tied to their enrollment in
university professional-training programs, and they remained students
throughout this time. To the extent that they suffered university
sanctions for their performance in these settings, those sanctions should
have been evaluated under a student speech, rather than an employee
speech, framework.
That, of course, circles back to the central question of this
Article: what is the appropriate student speech framework for the
certification cases? Having explored the insights that Hazelwood, the
university deference literature, and the public employee speech doctrine
bring to bear on this question, I now turn in Section V to propose some
principles for a more unified framework.
V. A UNIFIED FRAMEWORK FOR THE CERTIFICATION CASES
This Article began by identifying the certification cases as a
distinct category within the student speech landscape. This category has
several distinguishing features: (1) it involves a student being trained for
a profession by a (public 7) university; (2) graduation from this program
175. Id.
176. Watts v. Fla. Int'l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2007).
177. Students cannot, of course, bring First Amendment claims under the
United States Constitution against private universities, although they may be able to
bring related state claims under state constitutions or statutes, depending on the
protection provided by their state. See, e.g., State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 (N.J.
1980) (allowing student's free speech claim under New Jersey Constitution against
Princeton University to go forward); see also Cal Educ. Code § 94367 (2012) ("No
private postsecondary educational institution shall make or enforce a rule subjecting
a student to disciplinary sanctions solely on the basis of conduct that is speech or
other communication that, when engaged in outside the campus or facility of a
private postsecondary institution, is protected from governmental restriction by the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution or Section 2 of Article I of the
California Constitution.").
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reflects the university's approval-what I refer to as its "certification"-
of the student as being fit to enter the profession; (3) the student has
uttered speech, whether or not in the classroom/curricular context, that
undermines the university's confidence that the student will perform the
profession in a way that accords with the university's conception of the
profession; and (4) the university's sanction of the student has stemmed,
at least in substantial part, from that concern. Fundamentally, what
differentiates these cases is the presence of the certification rationale-
that the universities here are not solely sanctioning student speech for
protective or educational reasons, which usually cover the waterfront in
student speech cases, but also because they are no longer comfortable
certifying that student for the profession.
Hazelwood, the university deference cases, and the public
employee speech framework all suggest that this is a legitimate concern.
Hazelwood identifies the need for schools to control speech that might be
seen as bearing the schools' own imprimatur, the educational deference
For an interesting certification case brought against a private university in New
York, see McConnell v. LeMoyne Coll., No. 5:05 CV 634 JFS/DEP, 2005 WL
2033485 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2005). This case involved a student enrolled in Le
Moyne College's Master of Science for Teachers program. Id. at * 1. As part of his
required coursework, the student submitted a written assignment-a "Classroom
Management Plan"-in which he indicated that he disagreed with multicultural
education and felt that "corporal punishment has a place in the classroom." Id His
teacher gave him a grade of "A" on the assignment, but nonetheless referred him to
the chair of the Education Department, who then sent him a letter expelling him
from the program, stating that "I have grave concerns regarding the mismatch
between your personal beliefs regarding teaching and learning and the LeMoyne
College program goals." Id. at *2. The student filed suit in federal court, bringing,
inter alia, a free speech claim. Id. at *1. This claim was rejected, however, because
the University was not deemed to have engaged in state action. Id at *1-3.
Ultimately, the student was able to obtain some relief in state court, which ordered
LeMoyne College to follow its own due process procedures set forth in its rules and
regulations before expelling the student. See McConnell v. LeMoyne Coll., 25
A.D.3d 1066, 1068-69 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (holding that under New York law,
"'[w]hen a university has adopted a rule or guideline establishing the procedure to be
followed in relation to suspension or expulsion[,] that procedure must be
substantially observed"' (quoting Tedeschi v. Wagner Coll., 404 N.E.2d 1302, 1306
(N.Y. 1980)). The College ultimately decided not to appeal this ruling (or,
apparently, to institute formal expulsion proceedings), and the student returned to
class. See Michelle York, Back in Class After Expulsion Over Paper, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 2006, at B6.
UNIVERSITY IMPRIMATURS
literature emphasizes the importance of allowing universities to define
their own educational missions and make academic decisions in accord
with those missions, and the Pickering-Connick-Garcetti framework
endorses the notion that even otherwise-protected "off-duty" speech can
be sanctioned when it indicates a lack of fitness for a job. Furthermore,
in none of these lines of cases has the Supreme Court prohibited
governmental actors from making viewpoint-based decisions,
notwithstanding the First Amendment's general disfavor toward
viewpoint discrimination. Indeed, the logical underpinnings of these
doctrines point toward the inevitability of viewpoint discrimination in
some instances. These strands come together to suggest that universities
should have significant deference here. Indeed, given the overlapping
concepts in these three lines of authority, it is not surprising that scholars
have pointed to some of the thematic links between them.
But such deference should not be unlimited. Hazelwood and the
university deference cases similarly indicate that university decisions
must be pedagogically legitimate, as expressed both by Hazelwood's
"legitimate pedagogical concerns" standard 7 8 and Ewing's suggestion
that courts should not overturn universities' academic decisions unless
they reflect a "substantial departure from accepted academic norms."l 79
Additionally, the university deference cases emphasize the importance of
careful deliberation and appropriate process-concepts that, although not
discussed in Hazelwood, arguably serve as a gloss on what it means for a
decision to be "reasonably related" to a legitimate pedagogical concern,
particularly in the university setting. Finally, both Hazelwood and the
Pickering-Connick-Garcetti trilogy suggest that there should be a
dividing line between speech sanctions that result from "on-duty" speech
(or, in the school context, curricular speech) and those that result from
"off-duty" speech (a.k.a. non-curricular, "independent" student speech).
This does not mean that the latter category can never be regulated, but
the presumptions do require some shifting here.
The above discussion points toward some concrete principles for
approaching the certification cases. First, school sanctions of student
speech that occurs in curricular settings-whether in the classroom,
clinical practicum settings, or perhaps in certain school-sponsored
178. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
179. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985).
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activities that are closely tied to professional-training programs-should
be subject to Hazelwood's "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns" standard, as the above-described cases held. Moreover, the
viewpoint-based nature of such concerns should not render them
illegitimate, provided that the university can credibly assert that these
concerns genuinely stem from university officials' own standards of
competence and professionalism in the field for which they are training
the student. Where the student can demonstrate that this conception
reflects a substantial departure from accepted professional norms, that
will indicate illegitimate behavior on the university's part. But the
university should not be required to show that all professionals in the
field adhere to these standards. It is enough to show that these standards
fall within the spectrum of professional norms, and that the university
itself subscribes to them.
Additionally, the university should be required to demonstrate
the reasonableness of the sanction itself, as well as the reasonableness of
the process through which the sanction was reached. Although courts
should not (and are historically reluctant to) micro-manage educators'
academic decisions, both Horowitz and Ewing indicate that judicial
deference to such decisions should rest on careful, deliberate decision-
making. Moreover, both decisions seemed to view as relevant the fact
that the plaintiff students-who were ultimately expelled-had displayed
persistent problems and had been repeatedly warned about their
universities' concerns. If, for instance, a university were to
immediately expel a student for his or her speech, as opposed to first
imposing more limited sanctions and/or working with the student to try
to address the concerns raised by his or her speech, that would strongly
suggest unreasonableness (absent extraordinary circumstances).
180. See id.; Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 85
(1978).
181. Indeed, if a university failed to provide such procedures, this might
violate the student's constitutional due process rights, a possibility left open by the
Horowitz and Ewing Courts. It might also violate state law. See, e.g., McConnell, 25
A.D.3d. at 1066; supra note 177. My point, however, is that some basic expectation
of reasonableness should be imported into the free speech analysis as well. See also
Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 152, at 1542
("The argument for strong deference [to universities as First Amendment
institutions] will be especially weighty in those cases in which the university, in
420 [Vol. 11I
UNI VERSITY IMPRIMATURS
It is instructive to return to Ward with these standards in mind.
There, Eastern Michigan University officials believed that a counseling
student's refusal to validate clients' same-sex relationships-and
corresponding request to refer such clients-was inconsistent with the
American Counseling Association's Code of Ethics, which stated that
counselors should "respect the diversity of clients," "avoid imposing
values that are inconsistent with counseling goals," and not condone
discrimination based on sexual orientation.' 8 2 As the Ward court pointed
out, this was not the only reasonable reading of the ACA's Code of
Ethics, which also stated that counselors could refer clients if they
"determine[d] an inability to be of professional assistance" to them, and
specifically allowed counselors to "choose to work or not work with
terminally ill clients who wish to explore their end-of-life options."' 83
Similarly, expert witnesses and textbooks expressed conflicting views on
the ethics of values-based referrals.184 Given the range of views here,
Eastern Michigan University's reading of the Code was certainly not a
substantial departure from accepted professional norms. Indeed, the
ACA's chief professional officer, while acknowledging that he knew
counselors who referred gay clients seeking to discuss relationship
issues, opined that "refusing to counsel someone on issues related to
,,185
sexual orientation is a clear and major violation . ... To be sure, the
University muddled the waters somewhat by arguing that it had a
"blanket rule" prohibiting practicum students to make referrals, when in
fact it had once allowed a referral by a grieving student who wanted to
refrain from counseling a grieving client.'8 This provided a basis for the
court to conclude that the university's actions might have been a pretext
for discrimination against Ward's faith-based speech. But had the
University argued that granting a master's degree in counseling to a
reaching an academic decision, is roughly following the established norms and
procedures that are in place for such questions. Those practices will have developed
in light of both the general norms that govern most universities and academic
disciplines, and the particular sense of that individual university as to what its
academic mission requires.").
182. Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 735 (6th Cir. 2012).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 736.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 736-37.
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student who refused to validate same-sex relationship would conflict
with its own conception of appropriate counseling behavior-and that it
was uncomfortable placing its imprimatur on this student-the court
should have deferred to this argument as legitimate, despite its
viewpoint-based nature.
Moreover, Eastern Michigan University would have been able to
demonstrate the reasonableness of its process and the ultimate sanction
against Ward. University officials did not immediately expel Ward when
she asked to refer the gay client to whom she had been assigned for the
practicum.8 Instead, her faculty supervisor met with her and agreed to
refer the client, but also expressed concerns about her request, and
arranged for a further "informal review," a non-disciplinary meeting
designed to "assist the student in finding ways to improve his/her
performance or to explore the option of the student voluntarily leaving
the program." 88 At this informal review, two faculty members met with
Ward to discuss their concerns, and gave her the further option of
seeking a formal review, in which a faculty-student committee considers
allegations of improper behavior or poor academic performance.' 89
Before the formal review, a faculty member specifically explained to
Ward why she believed that Ward's referral request was inconsistent
with the ACA's Code of Ethics.1 9 0 These issues were discussed in depth
at the review hearing itself, and Ward had the opportunity to respond.
Only when the university officials became convinced that the conflict
was irreconcilable was Ward expelled from the program.192
The same standards should apply, as noted above, even when the
student's speech occurs in a clinical practicum and it is the field
supervisor, rather than a university official, who imposes the initial
sanction. Although universities may be powerless to change the minds
187. Ward thus stands in contrast to McConnell v. LeMoyne College, No. 5:05
CV 634 JFS/DEP, 2005 WL 2033485 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2005), in which an
education graduate program immediately expelled a student who wrote that he
thought corporal punishment had a place in the classroom. See McConnell, 2005
WL2033485, at *1; see also supra note 177.
188. Ward, 667 F.3d at 731.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 731-32.
UNIVERSITY IMPRIMA TURS
of such supervisors-in both Watts and Snyder, it seems clear that the
supervisors were unwilling to allow the students to continue in their
placements-they should not be able to automatically withhold students'
degrees on that basis. Rather, they should be required to show that the
student's speech violated the university's own legitimate pedagogical
standards, and that the ultimate university-imposed sanction was
reasonable. Particularly troubling is that in Watts, the speech for which
the student was punished-telling a patient that "church" was one place
that she could find a bereavement support group, after noticing on her
patient assessment form that she was Catholic-did not violate any
"guidelines or requirements of the MSW program." 93  It is entirely
unclear why the University could not have taken other steps to remedy
the situation, such as re-assigning the student to another clinical
practicum or permitting him to re-enroll in the course. Perhaps there
were complicating factual circumstances here, but the court's willingness
to simply accept that once Watts was terminated, he could not complete
the course, and therefore could not earn his degree, is troubling. The
above principles would point toward a different result.
The calculus shifts when a student is sanctioned-pursuant to
certification-related concerns-by a university for his or her non-
curricular speech. Although a student's non-curricular speech can
legitimately undermine a university's confidence that he or she is fit for
the profession, as in Tatro,194 students do need more autonomy in the
non-curricular realm. Indeed, the Tatro court itself noted the "potential
for a university to create overbroad restrictions that would impermissibly
reach into a university student's personal life outside of and unrelated to
the program." 95 In this context, the "legitimate pedagogical concerns"
standard should be heightened, and the burdens flipped. Rather than
requiring a student to show that the university's concerns reflected a
"substantial departure from professional norms," and deferring to the
university's conceptions of professionalism and competence as long as
they fall within the accepted spectrum of professional norms, the
193. Watts v. Fla. Int'l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2007). Indeed,
the district court stated that the student's speech was in fact "consistent" with the
MSW program guidelines. Watts v. Fla. Int'l Univ., No. 02-60199-CIV-AJ, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40310, at *5 (S.D. Fla. June 9, 2005).
194. See generally Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012).
195. Id. at 521.
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university should instead have to show-as Tatro required-that its
concerns were "narrowly tailored and directly related to established
professional conduct standards."1 9 6 Although such standards need not be
codified in writing, as were the statutory standards for mortuary science
licensees in Tatro,'9 the university should have to prove that such
standards are firmly established in the field.
Additionally, the same requirement that the sanction-and the
process through which it was reached-be reasonable should still apply.
In many cases, this reasonableness requirement will also mean that the
student should have received prior notice about engaging in the speech in
question. In Tatro, for instance, the mortuary students had specifically
been told before the anatomy lab that they could not blog about cadaver
dissection, including on Facebook or Twitter.' Had Tatro been
punished for her posts without such advance notice, the reasonableness
of the University of Minnesota's response would have been more
questionable. Of course, the University still could have argued that
Tatro's failure to independently realize that such posts were
inappropriate indicated her lack of fitness for the mortuary profession.
At the very least, however, appropriate regard for students' own personal
lives would suggest that the severity of sanction for such non-curricular
speech, without any advance notice prohibiting such speech, should
typically be limited. In the end, this is likely to be a highly fact-specific
inquiry.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Symposium's focus on Hazelwood, on the occasion of its
twenty-fifth anniversary, provides a wonderful opportunity to explore the
implications of Hazelwood's reasoning beyond the high school
newspaper context. Indeed, Hazelwood's "imprimatur" concept
converges in illuminating ways with the broader university deference and
public employee frameworks, shedding light on the growing number of
student speech cases that implicate the certification rationale. By
recognizing the legitimacy of universities' interest in withholding their
196. Id.
197. Id. at 522.
198. Id. at 512.
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imprimatur from students whose speech undermines the universities'
confidence in their fitness for the profession for which the university is
training them, while simultaneously limiting that deference to enforce the
rights of student speakers, courts can strike a balance that appropriately
protects the competing interests of students and universities.
